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the canon. For instance, Margaret Cavendish’s and Mary Astell’s writings 
about social and metaphysical liberty provide important insight into the 
link between the human and moral order in early modern Europe.
But this criticism is by no means meant to indicate that the aim of the 
volume is not met. Watkins has done an excellent job of demonstrating the 
richness and promise of the narrative of order. The volume should serve as 
a call to specialists and advanced students in the field to develop and ex-
tend these themes within the systems discussed here and to other thinkers 
in the history of philosophy.
Solved by Sacrifice: Austin Farrer, Fideism, and the Evidence of Faith, by Robert 
MacSwain. Leuven: Peeters, 2013. xiii + 275 pages. $88.74 (paper).
BRIAN HEBBLETHWAITE, Queens’ College, Cambridge
This book is unquestionably a major contribution to the study of Austin 
Farrer’s writings and to philosophical reflection on the topic of faith and 
reason. It still betrays its origin in a doctoral dissertation, but its thorough-
ness in knowledge of relevant sources and background, and of fascinating 
biographical detail about Farrer, is most impressive. One cannot resist a 
wry smile, however, at the presence of so many long footnotes in a book 
about an author who forswore footnotes altogether.
Austin Farrer, regarded by many as the leading Anglican philosophical 
theologian of the twentieth century, was for many years Fellow and Chap-
lain of Trinity College, Oxford. He ended his career as Warden of Keble. 
His many books include Finite and Infinite, The Glass of Vision, The Freedom 
of the Will, Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited, Saving Belief, A Science of God?, 
and Faith and Speculation. What has impressed his colleagues, pupils, hear-
ers (he was a great preacher too), and readers was the way in which he 
combined philosophical skill, theological acumen, and profound spiritu-
ality. Readers of MacSwain’s book will want to ask whether a sufficiently 
balanced picture of Farrer’s many-sidedness is maintained.
The title of the book should first be explained. “Solved by Sacrifice—sol-
vitur immolando” was Farrer’s parody of the solution to Zeno’s well-known 
paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise, which “solvitur ambulando,” that is, 
is solved by carrying on walking and overtaking the tortoise, not by con-
tinuously stopping and thinking at fifty per cent segments of the distance 
behind. Similarly, Farrer urges (in a sermon, be it noted), Christian faith 
finds its justification, not in logic or argument, but in actually following 
the way of the cross and finding spiritual blessedness thereby. This is 
manifestly true of the saints and up to a point of the ordinary believer 




too. Reference to such experiential justification of religious belief certainly 
played an increasingly important role in Farrer’s writing about faith and 
reason, but it remained only one element in his blend of spirituality, theol-
ogy and philosophy. Readers of Faith and Philosophy will be forgiven if they 
find themselves wanting to focus as much on the latter two as on the first 
of these three elements.
MacSwain takes his starting point from the initial fear expressed by 
Farrer’s friend and colleague, Basil Mitchell, on reading the MS of Farrer’s 
last book, Faith and Speculation, that Farrer “had become a sort of fideist.” 
Mitchell later withdrew this complaint, concluding, rightly in my judg-
ment, that Farrer remained a rationalist to the end. MacSwain rejects this, 
holding that, largely under the influence of the Princeton philosopher/
theologian, Diogenes Allen, Farrer did indeed become at least a moderate 
fideist.
Of course it depends what you mean by “fideist.” MacSwain devotes 
his second chapter to this question, setting aside pejorative senses of the 
term, and distinguishing mainly between an “extreme fideism” that ap-
peals to faith alone and a “moderate fideism” that begins with faith but 
allows for rational defense and exploration from within faith’s commit-
ment and perspective. The latter was Allen’s position and MacSwain’s the-
sis is that Farrer eventually came very close to this view, not only in Faith 
and Speculation but also in earlier sermons and essays as well. The term 
“fideism” remains pretty slippery, however, and it does not help to find 
the notion of “semi-fideism” introduced. This is held to be an approach 
that begins with faith but at the same time permits support and clarifica-
tion by probabilistic natural theology and by theology of revelation, as in 
the work of Basil Mitchell and even of Richard Swinburne. At this point 
one would really have preferred the term “fideism” to be dropped and 
the discussion conducted simply in terms of the relation between faith 
and reason, as it was by Farrer himself.
Certainly Farrer was not a foundationalist. Faith is not founded on rea-
son. Farrer begins with faith, both in the sense of the Christian faith, that 
is, the tradition handed down and expressed in the creeds, and also in the 
sense of the believer’s personal faith, although he allows, in sermons as 
well as in his books, this starting point to be no more than exploratory, an 
“initial faith” open to enquiry and critique. (I would not wish to contrast 
an open heart with an open mind here as MacSwain does. A mindless 
heart only means fideism in the pejorative sense.) It would, of course, be 
absurd to suggest that the believer has also to be a philosopher, but both 
the faith tradition and personal faith have metaphysical presuppositions 
and implications; and these are what Farrer was primarily concerned with 
throughout his writing career, right up to Faith and Speculation.
The reason why MacSwain gives perhaps too much prominence to the 
influence of Diogenes Allen on the development of Farrer’s thought is his 
decision to focus primarily on religious epistemology in Farrer’s work 
to the relative neglect of metaphysics and doctrine. This is fair enough if 
Faith and Philosophy492
one’s main interest is faith and reason, but a rounded picture of Farrer’s 
importance as a philosophical theologian is distorted if his spirituality is 
allowed to overshadow his philosophy and theology. As I say, what has 
impressed enthusiasts for Farrer’s work is the way he combined these ele-
ments and held them in creative tension.
Certainly Zeno’s paradox solvitur ambulando. But it is also solved by ra-
tional reflection on the difference between continual motion and segmental 
haltings. Similarly, the paradox of faith solvitur immolando. But it is also 
open to the rational support and clarification by what Rowan Williams 
called Farrer’s “viable and sophisticated natural theology,” of which Austin 
Farrer remained a masterful exponent till the end.
Philosophical Religions from Plato to Spinoza: Reason, Religion, and Autonomy, 
by Carlos Fraenkel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 358 
pages. $79.00 (hardcover).
JAMES BRYSON, McGill University
In a bold and exciting new book, Carlos Fraenkel traces a tradition of what 
he calls “philosophical religion” from its beginnings in ancient Athens 
through Jewish and Christian Alexandria and through medieval Arabic 
falsafa, arriving finally at the early modern thought of Spinoza, who rep-
resents both the culmination of this tradition as well as a challenge to its 
legitimacy by planting the seeds of biblical criticism. This is no mere his-
torical exercise. Fraenkel presents philosophical religion as a response to 
the Enlightenment confidence in the rational autonomy of the individual, 
which he sees as the greatest challenge to maintaining religious culture 
within the parameters of evolving modern institutions that prize the 
equality of all persons ahead of religious authority.
Fraenkel explains that the post-Enlightenment consensus which sepa-
rates philosophy from religion would puzzle historical proponents of 
philosophical religion, who are called to become God-like through the 
perfection of reason, as Plato teaches in the Theaetetus. Thus philosophy 
is the highest form of worship, for which it simultaneously provides the 
foundation. Beginning with the metaphysical concept that God is Reason, 
historical forms of religion are regarded as exhortations to the practice 
of philosophy. Homer, Moses, Christ, and Mohammed employ revelation 
as a tool to set their respective religious communities, composed princi-
pally of non-philosophers, on a path to the philosophical life. This way of 
reading historical religion is an alternative to cultural revolution, which 
would remake society in the image of an ideal Republic based on pure 
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